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1. Introduction 
 
Public utility regulation has been charged historically with protecting the public’s 
interest. The behavior of monopoly or dominant incumbent suppliers in the 
telecommunication industry that may be consistent with the public interest has long been 
subject to controversy as has the issue of whether public intervention is needed to protect that 
interest. Viewpoints have varied between two poles. On the one hand, a “light touch” 
regulatory apparatus has been championed to promote the free play of market forces. On the 
other, regulatory intervention has been deemed essential to provide the discipline of the 
market and to protect the public interest in the development of infrastructure and services 
(Horowitz, 1989). Debates about the need for regulatory oversight and the impact of 
regulatory intervention in the United States have been continuous and often acrimonious.1 
With the establishment of a formal regulatory apparatus in the United Kingdom in 1984 there 
have been varying degrees of controversy over how best to ensure that the behavior of 
incumbent firms and the new entrants in the telecommunication industry is consistent with the 
public interest.2 
 
The issues of whether, and in what form, regulation should be applied to the rapidly 
changing telecommunication infrastructure and related information and communication 
services markets are now considerably more complicated than they were in the monopoly era 
of telecommunication. From the mid-1990s, in the United States and Europe, the spread of the 
Internet as a platform for service applications for citizens and for the commercial sector has 
been challenging the incumbency of traditional telecommunication operators. Internet 
developments have provoked questions about whether new forms of regulation are needed to 
ensure that the evolutionary forces in the market for Internet access and related services 
produce outcomes that are in line with the public’s interest in high quality, low cost services. 
Is there a case for regulatory intervention to protect the public’s interest in the deployment of 
services that use the Internet as a platform?  
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For some analysts, such as Jason Oxman of the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) Office of Plans and Policy, the answer to this question is negative.3  
 
Fundamental lessons learned from the Commission’s thirty year deregulatory approach 
towards data networks include: do not automatically impose legacy regulations on new 
technologies when Internet-based services replace traditional legacy services, begin to 
deregulate the old instead of regulate the new; and maintain a watchful eye to ensure 
that anticompetitive behavior does not develop, do not regulate based on the perception 
of potential future bottlenecks, and be careful that any regulatory responses are the 
minimum necessary and outweigh the costs of regulation (Oxman, 1999: 3). 
 
Given the nascent development of electronic commerce and the relatively immature 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) market, Oxman argues that there is no basis for regulatory 
intervention at present because of the large number of entrants into this market. In contrast, 
Bar et al. (1999: 3) argue that the FCC’s support for “unregulation” of Internet developments 
“constitutes a fundamental policy reversal”. They suggest that sustained policy intervention is 
needed to encourage the continuing evolution of an open network infrastructure and services.  
 
As an observer of successive generations of technological innovation and their 
deployment in the telecommunication industry, Harry Trebing has brought substantial 
evidence to bear on the implications of changes in the structure of the industry, and the 
performance and conduct of both incumbents and new entrants. He has detected flaws in the 
“de” or “un” regulationists’ reliance upon market forces by demonstrating empirically that 
market developments, in many instances, have been inconsistent with an adequate standard of 
protection of the public interest. With William G. Shepherd (1995) he has argued that market 
entry is rarely free and without limit and he has demonstrated that new entrants are often 
unable to establish themselves without fear of retaliatory moves on the part of incumbents 
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(Trebing, 1995: 404). He has suggested that, “the network is a form of commons and the 
societal goal should be to permit the greater participation of everyone in this facility … The 
danger is that the discretion inherent in tight oligopoly will make the design and planning of 
the network more responsive to the monopsony power of the large user, or to the strategy of 
the incumbent firm as it seeks to enter new markets” (Trebing, 1995: 409). A principal 
consideration in determining the need for regulation and other forms of policy intervention is 
whether the benefits and opportunities associated with technological innovation are likely to 
“... be distributed on the basis of carrier discretion” (Trebing and Estabrooks, 1995: 543). 
Insofar as this is so, then the outcome “undoubtedly will be influenced more strongly by 
relative demand elasticities than by social values” (Trebing and Estabrooks, 1995: 543).  
 
In the face of a new generation of technological innovations embodied within the 
Internet, and its rapid diffusion, there is a growing need for independent assessment of the 
“proper role for government surveillance and intervention” (Trebing and Wilsey, 1993: 274). 
We begin our assessment with the observation that competition is best understood as an 
evolving process, rather than as an end-state.4 Thus, firms should not be regarded as “… 
powerless economic agents adjusting passively to parametrically given techniques, prices and 
quantities but as agents actively seeking the reorganization of production and market activities 
in the context of rival’s possible reactions” (Corsi, 1991: 124). The competitive process that is 
engaging the firms in the ISP market may give rise to positive economic and social outcomes. 
Alternatively, it may contribute to the persistence of “monopoly focal points” and the 
emergence of an intensely oligopolistic industry structure (Trebing, 1998: 62). This is the 
issue we assess in this paper. 
 
The phenomenal growth of companies providing access to the Internet in the United 
States and in the United Kingdom has suggested to some observers that rapid technological 
change and innovation are producing Schumpeterian (1961) “creative gales of destruction” 
that have sufficient strength to eliminate monopoly focal points thereby removing any 
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grounds for regulatory intervention to protect the public interest. Trebing has treated such 
conclusions with considerable suspicion. In fact, the dynamics of technological change may 
even strengthen the market power for key players in the industry (Trebing, 1998: 61). Our 
analysis in this chapter of the dynamics of the Internet industry focuses on the implications of 
the interplay between technological change and the control and co-ordination of emerging 
knowledge bases and capital flows within the industry. We conclude that there are strong 
signals that the processes of “creative destruction” are leading not to the erosion of market 
power, but to its reconstitution.  
 
The outcome of the reconstitution of an oligopolistic industry is inconsistent with the 
public’s interest in the evolution of a network “commons”. We also conclude that it will be 
extremely difficult to address these developments within the confines of traditional industry-
specific regulation. We acknowledge that digitalization and major changes in the 
cost/performance characteristics and architectures of the technological infrastructure for 
information and communication services are central features of the turmoil in the ISP industry 
and that there is considerable scope for new entry. Our examination of the investment 
strategies of key players in the ISP market in the United Kingdom illustrates that strategies 
are being implemented to effectively monopolize the co-ordination and control of the 
complex knowledge bases that are necessary for the supply of new services. The creation of 
new “monopoly focal points” is achieving more than a redefinition of control over the scale of 
market power on a spatial basis, i.e. the extension of control from national to global markets. 
It is also achieving a reconfiguration of the scope for market power, i.e. its extension into the 
control of new combinations of technological, knowledge and financial lock-ins as a means of 
securing the generation and appropriation of economic rents.  
 
We develop this argument through an analysis of the financial linkages that underpin 
the evolution of the ISP market in the United Kingdom. A survey of consolidations, alliances 
and merger activity during 1999 provides a basis for our analysis of the various forms of lock-
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ins that are occurring within the emergent ISP industry. In section 2 some of the insights 
arising from recent research on the relationships between the innovative technological 
architecture of the Internet and its market dynamics are highlighted. In section 3 a description 
of the networks of investors in the ISP market in the United Kingdom is provided as a basis 
for our analysis of the evolutionary pathways for the further development of the ISP market, 
which is presented in section 4. In the concluding section we reflect on the implications of 
recent developments for policy and regulation aimed at the protection of the public interest in 
the evolution of Internet-related services.  
 
2. Researching Internet Market Dynamics  
 
The focus of our analysis is on the evolving structure of markets for the supply of 
Internet access and the provision of Internet-related services by ISPs. The Internet has been 
defined as “…an international network of interconnected computers enabling millions of 
people to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of information from 
around the world” [footnote omitted] (Federal Communications Commission, 1999: 3). An 
ISP “is an entity that provides its customers the ability to obtain on-line information through 
the Internet” (Federal Communications Commission, 1999: 3). Multiple ISPs may be 
involved in the transmission of Internet traffic from its origin to its destination as shown in 
Figure 1.5  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here  
 
The Internet emerged as a network to support defense-related scientific research. As 
Leiner suggests, however, economic issues have become increasingly salient as the network 
has become accessible to users outside the scientific community (Leiner et al., 1998). The 
Internet differs from earlier networks because the choice of any individual technology is not 
dictated by a particular network architecture. Instead, technologies can be selected by a 
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provider and made to “interwork” with other networks through a meta-level “Interworking 
Architecture”. The open architecture of the Internet means that networks can be “separately 
designed and developed and each may have its own unique interface which it may offer to 
users and/or other providers, including other Internet providers. Each network can be 
designed in accordance with the specific environment and user requirements of that network” 
(Leiner et al., 1998: 4).  
 
The distinctive characteristics of the Interworking Architecture have been offered in 
support of the view that the evolutionary pathway is such that suppliers do not face barriers to 
market entry or exit. With the growth of the Internet to an estimated 56 million hosts by July 
1999 and some 7 million World Wide Web sites by August 1999 (Zakon, 1999), commercial 
exploitation has been accompanied by fierce price competition in some segments of the 
markets served by ISPs. Huston (1999: 1) argues, however, that,  
 
underneath the veneer of a highly competitive Internet service market is a somewhat 
different environment, in which every Internet Service Provider (ISP) network must 
interoperate with neighboring Internet networks in order to produce a delivered service 
outcome of comprehensive connectivity and end-to-end services, and therefore, every 
ISP must not only coexist with other ISPs but also must operate in cooperation with 
other ISPs. 
 
Internet carriage service, i.e. traffic distribution, has become a commodity service that 
provides little opportunity for product differentiation. In the traffic wholesale business there 
are opportunities only for a relatively low rate of financial return. Most ISPs, therefore, are 
seeking to participate in service retail markets where there are opportunities for differentiating 
products and the potential for increasing profit margins. 
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The interdependencies between ISPs mean that there is a hierarchy within the Internet 
structure. For example, there is a small number of global ISP transit operators, a second tier of 
national ISP operators and a third tier of local ISPs. At each tier, the ISPs are clients of the 
tier above as shown in Figure 2.  However, because there is a strong incentive to reduce costs 
and maximize revenues, ISPs often seek to establish direct interconnections that bypass this 
hierarchical relationship to their advantage. The aggregation of ISPs provides a basis for 
exploiting economies of scale and scope and for strengthening market position.  
 
Insert Figure 2 about here  
 
Huston (1999: 2) envisages two different trajectories for the evolution of the ISP 
market. On the one hand, a trajectory may emerge where quality of service differentiation and 
end-to-end tariffs are introduced in the Internet together with financial settlement 
arrangements between ISPs resembling those for telephony interconnections. On the other, 
the current Internet “uniform best effort environment”, which offers no basis for a uniform 
approach to revenue distribution, may prevail. In this case, incentives for the continuing 
consolidation of ISPs would remain strong. Huston (1999: 23) suggests that, “the Internet 
market is not a sustainable open competitive market. Under such circumstances there is no 
natural market outcome other than aggregation of providers, leading to the establishment of 
monopoly positions in the Internet provider space”. This evolutionary trajectory suggests that 
the competitive process will lead to variety reduction through increasing concentration in the 
industry and to the emergence of new “monopoly focal points”.  
 
In the United States, the FCC appears to support the first trajectory as the more likely 
evolutionary pathway. On this basis it decided that there was no need for regulatory 
intervention, at least at present (Federal Communications Commission, 1999). The FCC relied 
on its interpretation of the competitive process, which has enabled many small ISPs to 
populate the market often serving the same geographical or “local” customer base. In 1998, 
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for example, more than 92 per cent of the population in the United States had access to a 
competitive local ISP market (Downes and Greenstein, 1998). However, Downes and 
Greenstein caution against drawing conclusions on the basis of this evidence about the 
presence or absence of barriers to market entry. They point to the relatively high start-up and 
running costs associated with developing viable ISP businesses and they allude to the 
knowledge bases that are likely to be essential for the provision of added value and 
differentiated services.  
 
As an economic matter, starting and operating a node for a dial-up ISP involves many 
strategic considerations [references omitted]. Higher quality components cost money 
and may not be necessary for some customers. High speed connections to the backbone 
are expensive, as are fast modems. Facilities need to be monitored, either remotely or in 
person. Additional services, such as web-hosting and network maintenance for 
businesses are also quite costly, as they must be properly assembled, maintained, and 
marketed. Providing added value may, however, be essential for retaining or attracting 
a customer base. (Downes and Greenstein, 1998: 6) 
 
From a public interest point of view, Downes and Greenstein (1998: 21) suggest that “Many 
issues will remain unresolved [for universal access] until future research on access analyzes 
the precise determinants of firm entry and expansion strategies” [emphasis added].  
 
Further evidence in support of the second evolutionary trajectory for the ISP market 
is offered by Srinagesh (1997: 152) who suggests that the ISP market is one in which, “… 
prices have not lined up neatly with costs. … Competition among firms with sunk costs can 
be problematic, especially when there is excess capacity … Owners of physical networks may 
decide to avoid potentially ruinous price competition by integrating vertically and 
differentiating their services”. [emphasis added] (Srinagesh, 1997: 152). Srinagesh also 
highlights the importance of the knowledge bases that are important components of ISP 
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services such as customer support, information content, and methods of improving the 
reliability and quality of services. Both Srinagesh and Lehr and Weiss (1996) argue that these 
knowledge-related activities provide the basis for product differentiation and for adding value 
to Internet businesses. If substantial economic returns are to be generated, it is likely that ISPs 
will need to establish new “monopoly focal points”, not necessarily over access to the 
Internet, but over the information and content and the knowledge bases that are essential for 
product differentiation. 
 
The economic viability of alternative business models for Internet-based content 
provision also have been subjects for investigation. For example, MacKie-Mason et al. (1996) 
suggest that the structure of the Internet architecture affects content provision in different 
ways depending upon whether the network is designed to be “application-aware” or “content-
aware”. In the former case, ISPs can identify the general type of applications that are being 
invoked by users, e.g. e-mail, audio playback, or interactive video. In the latter case, the 
network can also be used to monitor and control the content that is transported. They argue 
that “network architecture can have important implications for the nature of information 
goods” (MacKie-Mason et al., 1996: 205) and that ISPs can play an editorial role in selecting 
the content made available to consumers. These features mean that ISPs are likely to have 
strong incentives to consolidate their control over the knowledge bases that permit this 
“editorial role” to be performed. 
 
ISPs are focusing on retailing a host of information products and services under a 
variety of business models and they have the potential to become significant intermediaries 
between citizens or customers and information creators (Eliasson, 1999). Their potential for 
growth depends upon whether they can “lock-in” their customers in a way that establishes a 
foundation for growth. This requires more than the achievement of traditional forms of “lock-
in” that have characterized the carriage business in the telecommunication industry or the 
content business in the broadcasting and cable industries. It also requires the sealing of 
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supplier-client relationships with respect to information and content and it requires money. As 
Eliasson (1999: 6) suggests, the ISPs link communication transport infrastructures with the 
“syndication of electronic content”. Consolidation of this linkage requires the combination of 
capabilities for knowledge generation that are required for innovation and the creation of new 
value added products and services. This is similar to developments in other high technology 
industries where business success depends upon a match “between the development and 
deployment of bodies of technological knowledge, on the one hand, and commercially 
successful (or useful) working artifacts, on the other” (Pavitt, 1997: 11). The innovative 
performance of the ISP firms is likely to be dependent upon cognitive mechanisms that affect 
the boundaries of the knowledge base that firms are capable of exploiting; upon the specific 
types of co-ordination mechanisms that are used to support learning and innovation; and upon 
the control mechanisms that are in place for allocating resources between the divisions and 
business units of a firm.  
 
In order to assess which of the two alternative trajectories for ISP market 
development is likely to prevail, it is essential to consider several dimensions of the 
competitive process in addition to those that are highlighted in this section. It is necessary to 
examine the transformations in financial markets that are influencing the capacity of ISPs to 
exploit new technological opportunities. To achieve a sustainable linkage between the 
carriage of “bits” and the provision of information services, new sets of financial flows must 
be organized and controlled and the institutional conditions must be put in place to secure 
strong economic returns. In the next section, we focus on developments in the ISP market in 
the United Kingdom. We hypothesize that the mergers and acquisitions in the ISP market will 
display a pattern whereby economic rents are being extracted by financial institutions in ways 
that: 1) bypass barriers to entry in existing markets; 2) reconfigure the market so as to reduce 
the high costs of learning associated with knowledge creation and the time needed to achieve 
customer lock-in; and 3) protect and control financial returns for investors.  
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The predominant viewpoint among policy makers in both the United States and the 
United Kingdom is that it is too early to employ regulation in the ISP market because this 
would threaten its growth potential. Another viewpoint is that “the broader consequences of 
oligopoly will be to adversely affect the infrastructure as a platform for supporting 
productivity growth throughout the economy” (Trebing, 1998: 65). The industrial dynamics 
of the ISP market are important because its prospects are intertwined with major shifts in 
economic activity within industrialized economies and with the distribution of employment 
opportunities and income.6 Insofar as the trajectory for Internet evolution implies new 
bifurcations in the market and the potential for lock-in, there may be a strong case for 
regulation to protect the social or public interest in Internet developments.  
 
3. The Evolving Internet Service Provider Market in the United Kingdom 7 
 
The ISP market in the United Kingdom is rapidly developing and, because of its 
smaller scale compared to the United States, it provides an interesting basis for analysis of the 
features of investment and their implications. The ISPs in Britain fall into three categories: 1) 
national Internet access providers serving mainly British companies using reciprocal or 
peering arrangements with overseas firms to provide international service; 2) international 
Internet access providers including companies that own, or are building, world-wide 
networks; and 3) private network providers, including the majority of national and 
international data networking service firms that use private network infrastructures and 
management, such as the large telecommunication companies, computing service companies 
and a number of small private network operators (Durlacher, 1997). In the first quarter of 
1997, nearly all the ISP activity in the United Kingdom was in the first category. The market 
showed signs of becoming bifurcated between the dial-up access market and the access and 
related services market for corporate users where efforts were underway to achieve product 
differentiation and there were expectations for market consolidation (Durlacher, 1997).  
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By July 1999, there were about 5.8 million dial-up users of ISP services (including 
subscription-free services) in the United Kingdom and the first non-metered usage ISP 
services were expected in the fourth quarter of the year (Durlacher, 1999a). The number of 
ISPs providing high-speed leased line access services was growing rapidly. It was estimated 
that close to 99 per cent of large organizations were connected to the Internet and that as 
many as 95.6 per cent of British-owned companies were outsourcing some services, including 
web hosting, remote access, web design and consulting (Durlacher, 1999b). By 1999 in the 
dial-up market, efforts were underway to secure a basis for further growth. Our analysis 
focuses on this market because the target customers are mainly citizens, consumers and 
smaller firms. Tables 1 and 2 show the estimated market shares held by the subscription free 
and subscription based segments of this market as of July 1999.  
 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here   
 
The ISP market in the United Kingdom differs considerably from that in the United 
States in a major respect in addition to its relatively smaller size. In Britain, end users pay 
charges for local dial-up connections to the ISP in contrast to the flat rate pricing of local 
service in most places in the United States. In the United Kingdom, ISPs may offer a flat rate 
for monthly service and by the middle of 1999 they had started to offer “free” services.  In 
addition, leased lines required by ISPs in the United Kingdom are more costly than in the 
United States. Our analysis is based on investor and supplier activity at the end of August 
1999. We map the patterns of ownership and control that link investors and the large ISPs in 
this market in considerable detail in the following section to provide a basis for examining 
two closely related processes of consolidation. The first involves the large firms that emerged 
following the wave of market liberalization, which affected the former public utility 
operators. The second involves a new tidal wave of American investors in the United 
Kingdom and continental European markets.8  
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3.1 The Giants’ Trail: Growth and Transformation  
  
There was rapid growth in the numbers of British companies offering Internet access 
and services in the first half of the 1990s. This early phase in ISP development was marked by 
the growth of new entrants, some of which achieved a relatively strong leadership position. In 
July 1999, for example, Demon Internet was ranked second to America OnLine/CompuServe 
in terms of market share in the subscription dial-up market, and Global Internet (a subsidiary 
of ITG - Internet Technology Group) was ranked fourth (Durlacher, 1999a). Other fast 
growing new entrants have maintained a high profile during the consolidation of the ISP 
industry. For example, Internet Network Services was ranked fifth in terms of market share in 
the subscription dial-up market in March 1997 (Durlacher, 1997).  We use these estimates of 
market position as benchmarks of the significance of the new entrants’ remarkable growth 
and of their efforts to sustain their positions in a rapidly changing market.  
 
It is not just the fast growing entrepreneurial ventures that have been securing their 
positions in the ISP market in the United Kingdom. The incumbents that emerged from the 
privatization of the public utilities, including electricity and telecommunication as well as the 
broadcasting authorities, have been assessing the scale and scope of these markets. Since the 
mid-1990s, the incumbents have been intensifying their strategies for entry into the ISP 
market and strengthening their positions in the market segments related to services for 
consumers and small businesses as well as those aimed at the large corporate users. By the 
end of the 1990s, following a wave of mergers and acquisitions, the incumbents had acquired 
many of the most successful early entrants. They also had forged global partnerships and/or 
merged their operations with American-owned companies. In the following, we depict some 
of these developments for the largest ISPs and we map some of the alterations in their 
ownership and control structures. Figure 3 provides an outline of the landscape of the 
consolidation of the ISP market in the United Kingdom. 
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Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
We begin with the trail established by entrepreneur, Cliff Stanford, who launched 
Demon Internet in 1992 with a personal investment of £20,000. The history of the 
phenomenal growth of Demon Internet as an ISP focused mainly on corporate clients is 
instructive. Demon reached a turning point in May 1998 when, after six years of development 
of a customer base from zero to 180,000, the company was acquired by Scottish Telecom. 
Stanford made a personal fortune of £66 million and went on to create a new venture, Redbus, 
a consultancy company for innovators, entrepreneurs, and business start up. Demon became a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Scottish Telecom. The trail does not end here, however. Scottish 
Power plc, Scottish Telecom’s parent, was formed following the privatization of the 
electricity supply industry in 1990 and the break-up and flotation of the Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB). It has followed a global strategy for growth like most of the 
privatized off-spring of the former publicly-owned utilities.  
 
In December 1998, the same year as the acquisition of Demon, Scottish Power 
announced a merger with PacifiCorp, an electric utility in the United States. As a result of this 
merger, PacifiCorp became a wholly-owned subsidiary of ScottishPower, the agreed name for 
the newly integrated company, and ScottishPower expected to enhance the potential for 
global expansion. Similarly, Energis, the telecommunication network operator and spin-off 
from The National Grid, the transmission branch of the former CEGB, has consolidated its 
competitive position in the market vis-à-vis the largest incumbent, British 
Telecommunications plc., or BT. BT, the former monopoly telecommunication operator, 
continues to controls some 80 per cent of the revenues generated by domestic telephone 
services in the United Kingdom. One aspect of the competitive response by Energis and 
Scottish Telecom has been to establish a network capacity sharing agreement.  
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Like Scottish Telecom, Energis has sought to strengthen its position in the 
information services market by acquiring Planet Online in August 1998. Planet Online is a 
successful new entrant in the Internet access and service provider market. Formed in July 
1995 in Leeds with the financial backing of the Yorkshire property tycoon, Paul Sykes, Planet 
Online was launched in September of the same year. Focusing on providing high performance 
Internet and Intranet solutions for the corporate business market, the company enjoyed 
substantial growth and achieved a turnover of £24.7 million in March 1998. Paul Sykes 
realized a £41million capital gain from the sale of Planet. Energis, having consolidated its 
position in the corporate market,9 was instrumental in the launch of Freeserve. This is the 
largest subscription-free ISP in the consumer segment of the market and the company is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Dixons Group plc.  
 
Freeserve’s launch followed in the innovative footsteps of a small new entrant, X-
Stream. This company had started a subscription-free ISP service funded by advertising 
revenues early in 1998. Dixons Group plc, Freeserve’s parent, in contrast to X-Stream, had 
substantial assets and a strong position in the consumer retail market, which has provided the 
venture with considerable “launching” as well as “staying power”. With nearly 33 per cent of 
its shares held by four of the most prominent financial institutions in the City of London,10 
Dixons Group, which is the largest retail outlet for electrical appliances in Britain, provided 
Freeserve with a secure financial base and a large potential customer base. This backing 
helped to take Freeserve to a leadership position in the consumer market in the record time of 
four months. Through a partnership with Energis, Freeserve obtained access to the necessary 
infrastructure and used the Dixons Group’s extensive distribution network of 350 stores to 
offer Microsoft’s free Internet Explorer software.11 BT’s quasi-monopoly position in the 
domestic market means that the majority of dial-up calls destined for Freeserve, and which 
are carried over the Energis network, originate on BT’s facilities. Nevertheless, Freeserve and 
Energis have reaped the benefit of their partnership. Freeserve has been able to generate 
revenues by taking a share of the revenues generated from the telecommunication usage 
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tariffs charged by BT to end-users for carrying traffic over its network, a percentage of which 
are rebated to Freeserve’s carrier, Energis.  
 
The subscription-free dial-up ISPs are generally developing a thriving market. 
However, there is one important reservation. Since January 1999, there has been an increase 
of 50 per cent in the average number of failed dial-up calls (Murphy, 1999). The growth of 
the new entrants in the subscription-free dial-up market is being accompanied by the rapidly 
increasing presence of large media companies. News Corporation and Rupert Murdoch’s Sun 
Newspaper, for example, launched a successful ISP named CurrantBun in 1998.12  By 
harnessing the advertising power of its owners, CurrantBun was able to achieve third position 
in this segment of the market by July 1999. LineOne, a joint venture between BT, News 
International (a News Corporation subsidiary), and United News and Media,13 was in fifth 
position in 1999 (Durlacher, 1999a). To meet the competition, BT also launched a 
subscription-free dial-up ISP named BTClickfree. Freeserve continued to dominate the 
subscription-free segment of the market with an estimated 32 per cent market share in July 
1999 and some 1.32 million active registered accounts as of June 1999. To consolidate their 
partnership, Energis acquired 5 per cent of Freeserve’s ordinary shares in June 1999 
(Computerwire Inc., 1999) and, as a result of Freeserve’s initial success, Dixons’ share price 
has doubled (Murphy, 1999).  
 
The growth of the subscription-free dial-up market has led to numerous disputes and 
protests between the competitors. For example, American Online (AOL) UK has claimed that 
ISPs that are linked to telecommunication network operators are putting the ISPs that are 
independent at an unfair disadvantage (Computergram International, 1999). Although there 
are concerns about the viability of the small “free” ISPs which provide services for charitable 
or education organizations, this issue is not likely to be the concern of AOL UK. In the 
consumer market targeted by ISPs, attention is focusing on the potential for loss of revenues 
further along the value added chain. It is also focusing on the use of subscription-free dial-up 
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ISPs as a potentially loss making marketing tool to achieve customer lock-in to virtual mazes 
of carefully designed electronic commerce galleries. Advertising provides an uncertain 
foundation for future revenue growth and it will be necessary for these ISPs to devise ways of 
creating new opportunities for sustained growth. As we discuss below, American Online 
Corporation, based in the United States, entered the British subscription-free dial-up ISP 
market with the launch of Netscape Online in the autumn of 1999.  
 
National Grid plc,14 the parent company of Energis, like its counterpart 
ScottishPower, has been forging partnerships and consolidating its market overseas.15 
National Grid plc is to acquire the New England Electric System (NEES) and, subsequently, 
Eastern Utilities Associates (EUA) after approval of the merger by the state authorities.16 
Changes in the National Grid’s corporate structure have been agreed by its shareholders. By 
the autumn of 1999, approximately 15 per cent of the company’s stock was held by two 
prominent financial institutions, HSBC Investment Bank and a subsidiary of The Prudential 
Corporation plc. The Prudential Corporation also holds a significant 6.03 per cent share of 
Scottish Power plc. Scottish Power’s strong growth rate is underlined by its substantial 
increase in dividend payments averaging 12.7 per cent per annum (Scottish Power plc, 1999).  
 
The merger of Scottish Power with the American electricity supply company, 
PacifiCorp, was strongly recommended to PacifiCorp’s shareholders with a full guarantee of 
the value of their shares. Under this agreement, the premium for PacifiCorp’s shareholders 
was guaranteed at 26 per cent above the market price of the company’s common stock. The 
conversion of PacifiCorp shares into American Depository Shares or ScottishPower ordinary 
shares was guaranteed on a tax free basis, and fractional shares were to be paid in cash. For its 
part, The National Grid announced exceptional dividend payments of 44.7 pence per share in 
1998. This means of improving capital efficiency was achieved by returning “excess capital” 
to shareholders. BT’s failed attempt at a merger with MCI was replaced by partnership 
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agreements with AT&T, while, at the time of writing, MCI-WorldCom was planning a merger 
with SPRINT, another of the large telecommunication network operators in the United States.  
 
Developments in the ISP market in the United Kingdom have been characterized by 
the convergence of the ISPs with the telecommunication network operators. This has taken 
place against a backdrop of the changes since privatization in both the telecommunication and 
electricity sectors in the 1980s and 1990s. In the former case, these changes have been 
characterized by the slow erosion of BT’s monopoly position. In the latter, they have been 
characterized by the entry of the incumbents into related technological fields. For example, 
some of the electricity companies have diversified from transmission into the 
telecommunication sector.  
 
Other developments in the ISP and the telecommunication market in the United 
Kingdom have provided the source for a different process of convergence in the knowledge 
base which supports the emerging industry. They have also contributed to a process of re-
definition and consolidation of the economic and corporate governance of associated markets. 
These developments are related to transformations in the cable television industry, which 
follow, in part, from the privatization of the Independent Broadcasting Authority. This 
process of transformation is illustrated by the experience of National Transcommunications 
Limited Inc. (NTL Inc.) and the corporate restructuring of Cable & Wireless Communications 
plc. (CWC), a subsidiary of Cable & Wireless plc. This restructuring involved the division 
and reintegration of CWC, and its acquisition of the ISP, Internet Network Services (INS), a 
new entrant in the British market.  
 
NTL Inc. was established in 1997 as a result of the acquisition of the privatized 
transmission network of the former Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), National 
Transcommunications Ltd. The former engineering arm and network backbone of the IBA 
was acquired by a small entrepreneurial cellular telephone company that had entered the cable 
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and telecommunication industry under the name of International CableTel (NTL Inc., 1998). 
The new company, NTL, resulted in the merging of state-of-the-art engineering capabilities 
for the development and management of terrestrial and satellite networks and fiber optic 
technologies. NTL’s consolidation of its technological assets and capabilities and its 
positioning in related segments of the market have produced a blazing trail of acquisitions. 
For example, in the year following its formation, NTL signed contracts with the 
telecommunication carrier, Energis, and the (indirect) wholly-owned subsidiary of the FMR 
Corporation (the Fidelity Management and Research Company/Fidelity Group), Colt 
Telecom, which had been operating in the United Kingdom market. 17 By 1999, NTL had 
acquired ComTel (including Telecential Communications), all the cable television and 
telecommunication outstanding stock of ComCast UK Cable Partners Ltd. via its subsidiary 
NTL Bermuda Ltd. as well as Diamond Cable. To consolidate its regional networks, NTL had 
also acquired Eastern Group Telecoms (in the United Kingdom), and, respectively, 40 and 30 
per cent of the outstanding stock of CableTel Newport with cable television and 
telecommunication franchises in South Wales. It also acquired Cable Enterprise Inc., the 
owner of cable television and telecommunication franchises in the northern suburbs of 
London. These consolidations were compounded by the purchase of the largest Irish cable 
television provider, Cablelink Ltd. All these companies became wholly-owned subsidiaries of 
NTL.  
 
Parallel to these acquisitions, NTL had developed a base of 200,000 customers in the 
Internet market. With a strong partnership as backbone provider and as part-owner of the 
subscription-free dial up ISP, Virgin Net,18 NTL added the entrepreneur, Richard Branson’s 
brand name to its market assets. In 1999, NTL Inc. declared that it had become ‘the largest 
broadband telecommunications provider in the UK and Ireland as measured by number of 
customers’ (NTL Inc., 1999). The competitive challenge mounted by NTL appears to have 
heightened the pressure on the incumbent telecommunication operators in the local services 
market. BT felt the pressure when NTL acquired BT Cable Services in July 1999, but the 
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main competitive threat has been to Cable & Wireless Communications plc. Trends in the 
further consolidation of the ISP market are suggested by the developments that led to the 
restructuring of Cable & Wireless Communications plc (CWC) and which produced a turning 
point in the expansion of NTL Inc. The restructuring of CWC took place against the 
background of a transaction between Cable & Wireless Communications and NTL that 
occurred at about the same time as the acquisition by NTL of BT Cable Services . The details 
of this transaction provide a glimpse into the process of re-defining the market scale and 
scope for NTL and Cable & Wireless. It also affected Telewest Communications, another 
competitor in the British cable market.19  
 
The transaction between NTL and CWC marked out a framework for the 
reorganization of the two companies’ core market, extended their geographical coverage, and 
defined new boundaries for their operational domains of expertise as well as their future 
development. These developments provide a foundation for future ‘lock-in’ of the customer 
base that are likely to influence the co-ordination and control of capital flows. Cable & 
Wireless Communications (CWC) plc., a 53 per cent owned subsidiary of Cable & Wireless 
plc., was created as the result of a merger between NYNEX Cablecomms, Bell Cablemedia, 
Videotron and Mercury Communications in April 1997 (Cable & Wireless Communications 
plc, 1999). With this merger, CWC took the lead in the consolidation of the cable industry 
and became the first British cable operator to offer digital television. As a result in 1998 CWC 
was the largest provider of integrated telecommunication and television services measured by 
revenue. It had a broad range of facilities and provided local, national and international voice, 
data and Internet services. It was among the largest British carriers of wholesale 
telecommunication traffic and the ninth largest carrier of international telecommunication 
traffic. In July 1999, Cable & Wireless plc, Cable & Wireless Communications plc (CWC) 
and NTL Inc. made a joint announcement regarding the restructuring of CWC and the 
subsequent separation of the company’s business into two branches: CWC DataCo with its 
corporate, business, international and wholesale operations, and CWC Consumer Co, 
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comprising the consumer cable telephone, Internet and television operations. While Cable & 
Wireless plc acquired complete control over CWC DataCo, the ownership of CWC Consumer 
Co was transferred to NTL Inc. The acquisition of CWC Consumer Co put NTL in the lead 
position in the United Kingdom as the largest cable television company, ahead of Telewest 
Communications. NTL’s consolidated cable network covers over half of British households 
passed by cable. With full control over DataCo, Cable & Wireless plc set out to integrate its 
corporate and business activities in the global market and shifted its focus towards rapid 
growth of the corporate data and Internet markets. The restructuring was designed to enable 
the company to consolidate and rationalize its operations to compete more effectively in the 
international end-to-end business services market.  
 
The transformation of the NTL and Cable & Wireless businesses was accompanied 
by settlements that resulted in the reorganization of capital flows. The acquisition of CWC 
Consumer Co. and BT Cable Services by NTL was backed by financing from France 
Telecom. An agreement with France Telecom enabled NTL to recover the cash paid to CWC 
shareholders and gave France Telecom a 25 per cent stake in NTL. The transaction between 
CWC and NTL also resulted in CWC’s receiving approximately 10 per cent of NTL’s 
common shares.20 Microsoft Corporation contributed to NTL’s refinancing by investing US$ 
500 million in NTL convertible preferential shares as part of an agreement to support the 
deployment of high-speed voice, video and data services. This was intended to boost NTL’s 
capacity to develop innovative services and to implement new technologies (NTL Inc., 1999). 
As a result Microsoft holds about 5.25 per cent of NTL stock. The consolidation of CWC and 
the acquisition of the remaining shares in CWC DataCo, involved a redistribution of shares 
from the new company.21 At the Cable & Wireless plc. Annual General Meeting in July 1999, 
the Chairman, Sir Ralph Robins, presented the company’s plan for a world-wide strategic 
repositioning with a concentration on the development of the data and Internet businesses. 
The earlier acquisition of MCI’s Internet business in the United States in September 1998 was 
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consistent with this announcement as was the acquisition of Internet Network Services (INS) 
in the United Kingdom. 
 
Internet Network Services (INS) (Holdings) Ltd. was created in 1995 by three 
entrepreneurs. Tim Chanellor, founder and managing director, had considerable experience in 
the computer industry. His entrepreneurial record had been achieved following the launch of a 
business that manufactured and distributed IBM PC compatible machines in Taiwan. After 
selling this business to investors he worked as an independent consultant. He entered the 
Internet business in 1990 by designing, building and selling dial-up systems to corporate 
customers and education establishments. Nina Steel was experienced in marketing and 
Richard Almeida was responsible for the design, construction and operation of TCP/IP routers 
that were used to support the backbone of the early university networks in the United 
Kingdom.  
 
INS was supported by two key investors: Baring Communications Equity and 
Spectrum Equity Investors LP. By 1997, INS was ranked fifth among the Internet access and 
service providers in the United Kingdom (Durlacher, 1997: 2). INS achieved a 150 per cent 
growth rate between 1996 and 1997 and a phenomenal 550 per cent growth rate in 1997-1998 
prior to its acquisition by Cable & Wireless. In 1998, before it was acquired by Cable & 
Wireless plc, INS purchased Wisper Bandwidth plc., a company founded in 1996 with the 
ambition of becoming a global Internet backbone provider. The acquisition of Wisper gave 
INS an increased European presence and direct connectivity with several major European 
business centers. INS was highly regarded for the quality of the service it provided to 
corporate users by offering customized solutions, such as filtered Internet connectivity, web 
hosting, managed co-location services, Virtual Private Networks, and Extranets and Intranets. 
INS fitted in well with the profile needed to accomplish the Cable & Wireless strategic 
repositioning (Cable & Wireless Communications Plc, 1999). 
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Telewest Communications plc, a major competitor to NTL and a strong potential 
competitor of Cable & Wireless in the global data and Internet services market, consolidated 
its position in 1998. Telewest Communications’ major shareholders are Microsoft 
Corporation and Libert Media, a subsidiary of AT&T, with 29.9 and 21.6 per cent of its stock, 
respectively. Telewest set out to expand its activities in the corporate segment of the ISP 
market in the United Kingdom with the development of Cable Internet, a data and Internet 
service provider launched in 1995. Following NTL’s acquisition of CWC Consumer Co, 
Telewest’s prospects for market expansion in the United Kingdom were constrained and it 
now ranks as the second largest cable operator in the market. 
 
Developments in the market in Britain also have been affected by a transaction 
between the two giants, MCI-WorldCom and American OnLine Corporation (AOL). In the 
last quarter of 1997 and in early 1998, MCI-WorldCom and AOL in the United States agreed 
to a bilateral sale and purchase of assets involving ANS Communications Inc. and 
CompuServe, the respectively wholly-owned subsidiaries of AOL and MCI-WorldCom. 
CompuServe provides Internet access connections and innovative customized applications. It 
has a large world-wide subscriber base. ANS Communications Inc. is a managed network 
service company that provides Internet connections, remote dial-up access, and security 
solutions. The company claims to manage one of the largest and fastest Internet services in 
the world and it is expanding.   
 
As a result of the agreement between AOL and MCI-WorldCom, MCI-WorldCom 
transferred the CompuServe business to AOL together with a cash transaction of US$ 147 
million, and ANS Communications Inc. was transferred to MCI-WorldCom. The transactions 
were complemented by a settlement of US$ 75 million from the German publishing company, 
Bertelmann AG, resulting in a 50 per cent interest in the newly created joint venture involving 
CompuServe Corporation. AOL generated US$ 207 million as a result of these transactions 
and consolidated the “material conditions” for a strategic agreement with MCI-WorldCom.  
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This agreement sealed an important collaborative relationship aimed at the 
development of high capacity networks within and outside the United States. However, the 
foundation of the settlement and the relationship between AOL and MCI-WorldCom is 
multifaceted and runs much more deeply than this. AOL’s entry into the ISP market in the 
United Kingdom highlights several other aspects of the momentum achieved as a result of the 
consolidation of corporate, financial, and knowledge networks and the contribution of the 
latter to the design and implementation of corporate strategies. These developments have 
contributed to the leading position that AOL has achieved in the United Kingdom market in 
approximately three years. Figure 4 shows the corporate network surrounding AOL, MCI-
WorldCom and Verio Inc. This figure highlights developments that have shaped the ISP 
market in the United Kingdom.  
 
Insert figure 4 approximately here 
 
Three elements are particularly important in this set of network relationships. The 
first relates to the co-ordination and control of financial flows and the recurring presence of at 
least one common investor with a significant financial stake in three of the major players in 
the network. In this instance, FMR Corporation, also known as the Fidelity Group, has 
significant holdings in AOL, Verio Inc. and MCI-WorldCom. Its significant position in the 
network is compounded by the fact that it is related to two other players in the United 
Kingdom telecommunication and ISP market. One of these is Colt Telecom, an indirect 
wholly-owned subsidiary of FMR Corp.. Colt Telecom is also a partner of NTL alongside 
Energis as we saw in the earlier discussion and the parent of Colt Internet, which was 
launched in 1993 in the United Kingdom. The other is Concentric Networks of the United 
States, which was in the process of acquiring a partner, Internet Technology Group (ITG), in 
the summer of 1999. ITG is the parent of Global Internet, which was ranked fifth in the 
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subscription-based dial-up market behind AOL, CompuServe, Demon Internet and BT 
Internet in July 1999 (Durlacher, 1999a).  
 
The second element that comes to light from this analysis of these networks of 
relationships is that another significant investor in Verio Inc. is Brooks Fiber Property, a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of MCI-WorldCom since January 1998.22 This means that 28 per 
cent of Verio Inc. stock is held in the hands of two of the prominent players in the network 
that we are considering here. The third element relates to the co-ordination and control of 
knowledge flows within this network of organizations. This aspect can be illustrated by 
examining the shared directorships between AOL and MCI-WorldCom and between MCI-
WorldCom and Verio Inc., as well as within a partnership between AOL and Verio Inc.  
 
AOL’s Chairman and Chief Executive, Stephen Case, is a member of the board of 
MCI-WorldCom. He is also a member of the Board of Directors of the New York Stock 
Exchange. MCI-WorldCom’s Director, James C. Allen, is a member of the Board of Verio 
Inc. MCI-WorldCom gained a presence in the United Kingdom ISP market through a merger 
with UUNET in 1998, a leader in the market with an estimated 33 per cent share in 1997 
(Durlacher, 1997). AOL’s partnership with Verio Inc. was forged in the United States and 
was an essential element in the strategic development of AOL/CompuServe’s leadership 
position in the United Kingdom after the company’s launch in January 1996. AOL has an 
exclusive agreement with Verio Inc., a large Web-hosting company and business-oriented ISP 
in the British market, which has targeted small and medium-sized businesses. A survey of 
1,100 companies in July 1999 estimated that Internet penetration among small and medium-
sized enterprises in the United Kingdom had increased by 37 per cent over the preceding 12 
months to reach 77 per cent. However, this growth was accounted for mainly by the uptake of 
subscription-free services and it was estimated that only one per cent of these companies was 
making full use of the Internet’s potential (Durlacher, 1999a). Verio Inc. launched Verio UK 
in 1997. Verio UK consolidated its position in June 1999 by acquiring a domain name 
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registration company called Rapidsite UK, which had been launched in 1997. The parent 
company, Verio Inc., is also a substantial investor in VIA NET.Works which owns two 
British entrants in the ISP market, I-way and U-NET UK, launched respectively in 1995 and 
1994. 
 
On the strength of these financial and strategic partnerships, AOL started an 
aggressive campaign to build market share in the British market in both the consumer and 
business segments, which are the core competence domains of CompuServe. By the summer 
of 1999 AOL, together with CompuServe, had achieved a one million strong subscriber base 
in the British market. AOL’s acquisition of Netscape Communications Corporation, which 
was consolidated by a stock-for-stock transaction valued at US$ 4.2 billion, gave AOL 
control of the most popular web portal in the British market, thereby reinforcing the potential 
of electronic commerce for both companies. This strategic merger was further consolidated 
with the appointment of the entrepreneur and Netscape co-founder, Marc Andreessen, as 
Chief Technology Officer of AOL in the United States (America OnLine, 1999b). Building 
on the strength of the acquisition of this portal, AOL launched a new venture, Netscape 
Online, in the subscription-free ISP market in the United Kingdom through a retail 
distribution agreement with Kingfisher plc. in September 1999. Earlier in the same month, 
Netscape Online software was co-branded with Woolworths for distribution in the United 
Kingdom (America OnLine, 1999a).  
 
In 1998, AOL had begun consolidating its core businesses in the United States by 
acquiring companies that were active in various segments of the interactive Internet service 
markets.23 These acquisitions equipped AOL with the necessary tools for the provision of 
highly customized services. The business strategy is aimed at encouraging users of the 
services to invest their time in tailoring services to match their preferences. Once they have 
invested their time, it is expected that users will perceive the “switching” costs of exiting 
AOL services as being relatively more significant, thus strengthening the company’s capacity 
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to lock-in customers and build market share. This strategy is illustrated in the following 
quotation. 
 
Personalization and Control Features-Members can personalize their [the member’s] 
experience on the AOL service through a number of features and tools, including a 
reminder service that sends e-mail in advance of important events, stock portfolios that 
automatically update market prices, Mail Controls, which allow members to limit who 
may send them e-mail and to block certain types of e-mail, Favorite Places, which 
allows members to mark a particular Web site or AOL areas, and Portfolio direct and 
News Profiles, which send stories of particular interest to members. The AOL service 
offers Parental Control to help parents form their children’s online experience, 
including tools that limit access to particular AOL areas or Web sites or to certain 
features (for example, the AOL Instant Messenger service or receiving files attached to 
e-mail or embedded pictures in e-mail, or access to premium services). The Marketing 
Preferences feature enables members to elect not to receive certain marketing offers. 
(America OnLine, 1999c: 4) 
 
Within the United States, AOL has been reorganized into three components: the 
Interactive Service Group, the Interactive Properties Group and the AOL International Group 
which oversees AOL and CompuServe services outside the United States. This restructuring 
appears to have created the conditions for achieving technological and information “lock-in” 
in a variety of areas that may help to secure the company’s development with respect to both 
market scale and scope. 
 
3.2 Summary 
 
The changes in the ISP market in the United Kingdom are reminiscent of the 
reconfiguration and emergence of “monopoly focal points” in earlier phases of the evolution 
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of network related industries. Our analysis of the technological, financial and knowledge 
networks that support the growth of the Internet-based information and communication 
services market in the United Kingdom suggests the way in which the emerging focal points 
are shaping the new segment of the industry. Recent transformations have begun to produce 
service differentiation through various forms of market control. This process is marked by a 
bifurcation between the subscription-free dial-up ISP market, which mainly targets consumers 
and small firms, and the subscription-based dial-up ISP market, which increasingly is 
targeting corporate customers. In the British market, emerging corporate linkages are 
characterized by the convergence of the ISPs with telecommunication network operators. 
These developments are taking place against the backdrop of the erosion of BT’s monopoly 
position in the domestic market and the entry of large incumbents from the electricity industry 
and the former public broadcast distribution sector. These changes have been accompanied by 
joint ventures and partnerships between the ISPs and the media, information technology and 
software firms.  
 
The large British-owned incumbent firms have been establishing a strong presence in 
global markets, but they have met fierce competition in their domestic market from 
American-owned firms. The British-owned incumbents have been seeking to strengthen their 
positions through acquisitions or mergers with American-owned companies, while the 
American-owned companies have been consolidating their positions in their own domestic 
market as in the case of AOL. On the strength of their alliances in the American domestic 
market, American-owned firms such as AOL/CompuServe have enjoyed a swift and initially 
successful launch in the British domestic market and they have been expanding into the 
continental European market. Continental European telecommunication network operators, 
such as France Telecom, have also increased their presence in British market. 
 
4. The Race for the Self-fulfilling Prophesy 
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We suggested at the beginning of this chapter that the emergence of new “monopoly 
focal points” in the ISP market involves more than a redefinition of the scale of the market 
power accruing to companies that are participating in markets associated with the 
development of the Internet. The analysis in the preceding section suggests that the 
emergence of the new focal points involves a reconfiguration of control over key knowledge 
bases. This process appears to be the result of an innovative combination of technological, 
financial and knowledge networks in ways that achieve effective customer lock-in. Insofar as 
this strategy is successful within the domestic market, there is a case for national governments 
to intervene to ensure that the market evolves in a way that is consistent with the interests of 
citizens, consumers and small firms.  
 
One conception of the Internet that has found widespread acceptance is that its open 
architecture supports an information and communication “commons” where social, cultural 
and economic aspirations of all kinds are valued. An alternative conception envisages the 
emergence of a bifurcated networking environment. In this view, and in the particular case of 
the United Kingdom market, the provision of sophisticated Intranet and Extranet services for 
large business users is consistent with the circulation and accumulation of financial capital in 
the interest of very large (mainly foreign) firms. This development will have profound public 
interest implications if it occurs in parallel with long term under-investment in the Internet 
infrastructure and the information and content of services that are accessible and affordable 
for citizens, consumers and small firms. Indeed, it is this development trajectory that appears 
to be emerging in the market in the United Kingdom. 
 
4.1 Interpreting the Trail: Consolidating Financial and Technological Control 
 
Building a new industry in an uncertain technological and commercial environment 
requires massive investment. The process of building the ISP market can be expected to give 
rise to new predominant forms of corporate relationships and these must be expected to 
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influence the market dynamics and trajectories within both the new industrial segment and 
related existing market segments. The implications of linkages between sources of finance 
and control over the strategic behavior of enterprises are a central theme in the literature on 
the determinants of corporate organization and industrial structure. The problems of financing 
large-scale operations are described in this literature as being central to the implications of a 
separation of corporate ownership and control.  
 
For example, when the concentration of economic activities forced the breakdown of 
family “tenure” and the increasing importance of capital raised on the stock exchange, liberal 
managerial theorists argued that decision-making power over the co-ordination and control of 
corporate assets would be entrusted to corporate managers (Berle and Means, 1932). Marxist 
analysts, in contrast, tended to highlight the greater significance of the development of 
finance capital for the emerging joint-stock corporation. Menshikov (1969), for instance, 
regarded the joint-stock company as an indicator of the growing power of financiers over 
corporate affairs. While the former expected the development of the joint-stock company to 
give rise to managerial autonomy, the latter suggested that “property” would remain a central 
determinant of the power structure influencing the behavior and performance of corporations.  
 
In the 1980s research by Scott (1985; 1986) and Mintz and Schwartz (1985) has 
revisited debates about the role of finance and corporate control. Drawing on Mintz and 
Schwartz’s work, Scott (1993) argues that while decision-making may be insulated from 
direct intervention by shareholders, the shareholders’ control derives from property 
relationships and the legal rights conferred by share ownership. Share owners have rights over 
the disposition of income and they have voting powers with respect to corporate affairs. In 
questioning the polarized views of the liberal management and Marxist theorists, Scott (1993: 
295) argues that control should not be considered in terms of a simple relationship between 
ownership and managerial powers of decision-making. Instead, issues of control should be 
considered within the context of the “institutional constraint” that is exercised by shareholders 
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over decision-making processes. This constraint is embedded in the dynamics of a given share 
ownership structure. Thus, he argues that, “it is now the strategic actions of the financial 
intermediaries in Britain and in the United States which are most influential in determining 
the constraints under which enterprises act” (Scott, 1993: 295). Scott’s view of the 
implications of linkages between sources of corporate finance and control over the strategic 
behavior of enterprises transcends the positions of the liberal managerial and Marxist 
theorists. For Scott, issues of ownership and control must be considered in the light of 
relations of power and the constraint created through networks of inter-corporate relationships 
(Scott, 1993: 294).   
 
The development of the British ISP market illustrates how networks of inter-
corporate relations have been sealed through shareholder arrangements that bind sets of 
(multinational) financial organizations and firms. In some instances, these relationships are 
reinforced by interlocking directorships. We have underlined the significant presence of a 
small number of large financial institutions as shareholders that are at the heart of the 
emerging ISP corporate networks in the United Kingdom. These institutions include The 
Prudential Corporation, HSBC Investment Bank, Mercury Assets Management, Merryll 
Lynch & Co. in the United Kingdom, and the FMR Corporation in the United States. We have 
also highlighted the inter-corporate direct and indirect shareholdings between companies, 
such as Microsoft and AT&T’s investments in Telewest Communications, or MCI-
WorldCom’s indirect holding in Verio Inc. via its subsidiary Brooks Fiber Properties. Our 
map of developments in the ISP market in the United Kingdom appears to corroborate Scott’s 
assessment of the significance of institutional shareholders within networks of corporations.  
 
However, the institutional constraint highlighted in Scott’s work is also expressed 
through the conditions created by ownership relations for the co-ordination and control of 
capital flows (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985). These, in turn, influence the conditions for the 
production of goods and services. (Keynes, 1936) identified the significance of these “new” 
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property relations for the dynamics of industrial growth that emerged alongside the 
development of joint-stock companies. He argued that these dynamics would constrain capital 
flows and that they would overcome the “pragmatically” grounded expectations of 
entrepreneurs. For example,  
 
With the separation between management and ownership which prevails to-day and 
with the development of organised investment markets, a new factor of great 
importance has entered in, which sometimes facilitates investments but sometimes adds 
greatly to the instability of the system. … But the stock exchange revalues many 
investments every day and the revaluations give a frequent opportunity to the 
individual … to revise his commitments. It is as though a farmer, having tapped his 
barometer after breakfast, could decide to remove his capital from the farming business 
between 10 and 11 in the morning and reconsider whether he should return to it later in 
the week. … Thus certain classes of investments are governed by the average 
expectation of those who deal on the Stock Exchange as revealed in the price of shares, 
rather than by the genuine expectations of the professional entrepreneur [footnote 
omitted]. (Keynes, 1936: 150-1)  
 
The ISP “constellation” in the United Kingdom appears to be subject to the increasing 
pressure of large institutional shareholder expectations and the accompanying set of 
institutional norms that constrain the co-ordination and control of capital flows in the 
emerging market. The predominant expectations are for an increasingly rapid turnover time of 
capital and rapid growth in profits. These expectations are punctuating strategic decision-
making within the ISP firms. While this is significant for the potential for financial lock-in, 
the evidence of the “trail” of investment suggests further implications for the evolution of this 
market. To highlight these, it is necessary to consider the processes of technical change and 
innovation in this industry and their implications for service production. 
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The dynamics of technical change and innovation are largely unexplored in the 
literature we refer to above. Yet, speculation as to the significant growth potential of the ISP 
market is substantially dependent on the exploitation of new information and communication 
technologies and the deployment of new products and services. New technological 
opportunities often give rise to a period of transition during which the new technologies and 
services are diffused and implemented. This requires not only sustained large scale capital 
investment but also substantial learning time, especially in the case of complex technological 
systems like the Internet. The deployment of high bandwidth infrastructures is creating the 
conditions for the delivery of a large (capacity) throughput for new information and 
communication services and there is growing excess capacity in some parts of the 
infrastructure. However, the capital invested in the infrastructure has an engineering life-cycle 
spanning several decades and this is creating intense pressures for the realization of short term 
expectations for a return on capital. In the highly competitive ISP market, the risk for 
investors is substantial. As a result, there is increased tension between the financial 
expectations of investors and the constraints created by the technological system in terms of 
both time and learning opportunities. This tension is being resolved under present market 
conditions through strategies that promote a rapid scaling up of the use of available 
infrastructure capacity. In the ISP market, the predominant strategies appear to be aimed at 
creating opportunities to exploit scale economies in infrastructure provision through 
consolidation between ISPs and network facility providers, and achieving economies of time 
through intensification of the development and marketing of increasingly higher value added 
services.  
 
The ISPs’ strategies for achieving rapid returns on their financial backers’ investments 
differ from those that characterized the formerly separate telecommunication carriage and 
content industries. The major players in the ISP market appear to be devising strategies aimed 
at achieving quasi-monopoly positions in newly differentiated segments of the market. Their 
redefinition of the scope of the ISP market seems to be aimed at increasing their capacity to 
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integrate and systematize learning to support production and distribution in new market 
areas.24 To the extent that this is achieved, it creates the conditions for optimizing their use of 
network capacity and securing a return on capital at a pace that may meet the expectations of 
financial institutions and other firms in their networks that are providing financial resources.  
 
Recent developments in the ISP market in the United Kingdom have been marked by a 
wave of acquisitions of small new entrants by large British-owned incumbents and by 
American-owned firms. These acquisitions may be playing an important role by reducing the 
time needed to learn and experiment in the new market and the time needed to build market 
presence. By acquiring the new entrants, the acquiring firms draw in the capabilities needed to 
develop new value chains that have scope for future development. At the same time, these 
acquisitions and mergers offer potential opportunities to increase control over the revenues 
generated by the expansion of network capacity use and the sale of higher value added goods 
and services.  
 
The lesson from the restructuring of Cable & Wireless Communications and the 
development of NTL is that the realization of technological, financial and knowledge lock-ins 
is dependent upon strategic repositioning aimed at streamlining the scale and scope of the 
large ISPs’ markets. The present round of repositioning is occurring alongside substantial 
capitalization. As the cases of NTL and Cable & Wireless Communications, and AOL and 
MCI-WorldCom indicate, quasi asset “swaps” are not uncommon. These asset exchanges are 
generating substantial revenues for large shareholders and creating positive feedback that, in 
turn, gives rise to higher expectations and further speculation.  
 
For the entrepreneurs who invest in the ISP business, exit represents an opportunity to 
capitalize on intangible assets embodied in learning and technological innovation. Acquisition 
of the small start-ups offers a way for these companies to access bandwidth and generates 
funds for business expansion. Some new entrant ISPs have managed to sustain their growth 
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through partnership agreements. For example, the subscription-free dial-up ISP, X-Stream, 
has a partnership agreement with Level 3 Communications of the United States (X-Stream, 
1999). This strategy also was initially chosen by the Internet Technology Group (ITG), one of 
the new entrants in the subscription segment of the ISP market. However, in this case, ITG is 
being acquired by its partner, Concentric Networks.  
 
Our analysis of the linkages between the players in the top layer of the ISP market for 
dial-up access in the United Kingdom illustrates that despite the nascent characteristics of this 
market and the appearance of multiple new entrants, the trail of financial capital suggests that 
the further evolution of the ISP market will not necessarily be consistent with a broad 
interpretation of the public interest of citizens, consumers and small firms. The processes of 
creative destruction and the flurry of new entry in the ISP market do not appear to be 
delivering a very high quality of service for citizens, consumers and small firms. The 
subscription-free dial-up ISPs are engaged in a frenzy of competition, which is accompanied 
by their failure to sustain high quality services for the end user. For example, the rate of dial-
up failure has increased by 50 per cent in the last year and some companies are offering 
technical support for their customers at premium telephone tariffs ranging from fifty pence to 
£ 1.00 per minute. Waiting times on technical support lines managed by automatic answering 
services can be up to 10 minutes.25 
 
The competitive process in the nascent ISP market in the United Kingdom is generating 
opportunities for British-owned small new entrants that are championed by entrepreneurs. 
Some have realized large capital gains through timely exit strategies. For the firms that have 
acquired the early start-ups and/or extended their services from the United States into the 
United Kingdom, there is evidence of consolidation and of the formation of tightly woven 
webs or networks of control. However, the stability of these firms is uncertain. Their high 
levels of capitalization are associated with the valuation of intangible assets, i.e., of their 
technological capabilities and competencies. The wave of investment in the United Kingdom 
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is the result of a “propensity to speculate” on technological and market potential rather than 
on the potential of tangible assets.  
 Speculative trends are not simply directed to existing tangible assets but to the 
potential benefits that might be lost if the assets supporting innovation are not controlled or 
acquired (Langlois and Robertson, 1995: 133-4).  As such, speculative activity on tangible 
assets becomes the manifestation of the future expectations of financial (and corporate) 
investors. It does not rely on or estimate the present value of productive assets (i.e. these 
assets are depreciating and are being ‘consumed’).  In the face of uncertainty and a highly 
competitive environment, investors anticipate the productive and innovative capacity of the 
future.  The resulting financial value put on assets is directed to the potential benefits of 
intangible assets (expected developments in technology, learning, innovative products and 
services) and the competencies for future production and therefore the realisation of future 
income.26 
For these firms a critical issue is time. Stock market investors could curtail the ISP 
boom if the speculative future fails to materialize. In order to sustain a high level of 
capitalization, the major players in the dial-up ISP market must learn how to transform 
prophesy into reality. They must overcome the hurdles of uncertain trends in technological 
development, the uneven deployment of infrastructure capacity, and skill deficits for service 
production and within potential user communities. They also face the challenge of integrating 
new sets of capabilities for both carriage and content creation and marketing within their 
organizations and build strong relationships with their customers. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
On the basis of the empirical evidence we have presented in this chapter, it appears 
likely that the predominant interest of investors who own the most significant ISPs in the 
United Kingdom market is in promoting attractive conditions for short term revenue growth 
and the maintenance of high levels of capitalization. The development of the British ISP 
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market suggests a trend toward the emergence of an oligopolistic industry that is inconsistent 
with the evolution of a network “commons” which will be  responsive to social values. The 
analysis presented in this chapter exposes the networks of control that are emerging through a 
reconstitution of market power in the ISP market. This analysis demonstrates trends that seem 
to favor: 1) the consolidation of the market in the hands of financial investors whose primary 
interests are in the rapid turnover time of capital rather than in the long-term development of 
services targeted at citizens, consumers and smaller firms; 2) a race between a small number 
of large players to consolidate the knowledge base (competencies and capabilities) needed to 
succeed in the new markets; and 3) increasing barriers to entry for small players that confront 
constraints on their capacity to expand and to offer financially viable services as alternatives 
to those provided by the large players. The combination of these trends is likely to produce 
pressure for the reduction of variety, an outcome that runs counter to the view that the 
Internet’s open architecture encourages diversity in the supply of content and information 
services.  
 
In the light of these observations, it seems unlikely that American style 
“unregulation” will be appropriate for the governance of Internet-related markets in the 
United Kingdom. In the absence of market intervention, the market terrain seems likely to be 
left to multinational players. This will marginalize small regional players within niche 
markets with limited scope for growth. The large ISPs have strong incentives to lock-in users 
to secure future revenues and to maintain high rates of capitalization. The strategies for 
achieving lock-in have expanded beyond those that were characteristic of the formerly 
segmented carriage and content industries. Liberalization has opened up new opportunities for 
competitive entry, but the privatization of the incumbents within the domestic market has 
altered the dynamics of the new markets. As Mintz and Schwartz (1985: 252) have argued 
with respect to transformations within the United States economy, “collective decision 
making within the business world directs capital flows that commit the resources of the 
country as a whole to the projects selected by the financial institutions”. In the case of the ISP 
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market in the United Kingdom, the networks of inter-corporate relations that are forming 
around a few core financial institutions and the top ISPs do appear to be “committing” the 
United Kingdom to trajectories for the evolution of Internet services that favor the large 
business users.  
 
In the light of these developments, it will be important to investigate the emergence 
and exercise of “market power” in the ISP market in a way that exposes the interdependencies 
between technical change, innovation and the role of finance in the process of competition. 
The current trajectory for ISP development is consistent with the interests of large 
corporations and expectations for strong revenue growth and rapid capitalization. In the light 
of the bifurcation of the ISP market and these incentives, opportunities for safeguarding the 
public interest are likely to come to light only through a more systematic analysis of the 
interplay between these factors and the socio-political conditions in which they are embedded.  
 
The two poles that we highlighted in the introduction to this chapter treated regulation 
as a means of promoting the free play of market forces, on the one hand; and as a necessary 
means of restoring the discipline of the market where monopoly or substantial market power 
are present, on the other. Both these poles of the regulatory spectrum are predicated upon the 
assumption that market forces can deliver economically and socially desirable outcomes. We 
acknowledge that regulation of some aspects of the carriage and content industries will 
continue to be needed to address the problems created by conventional “monopoly focal 
points”. However, our analysis suggests that traditional forms of industry specific regulation 
will not provide a satisfactory means of protecting the public interest. The newly articulated 
“focal points” of power in the ISP market will need to be tackled through new forms of 
regulation and governance. These will need to be formulated in the light of a better 
understanding of the evolutionary sources of market power and their implications for social, 
economic, and technological outcomes. 
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Notes 
                                                     
*
  Dr Michele Javary is a researcher and Professor Robin Mansell is Research Director 
at SPRU - Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex, United 
Kingdom where she also co-directs the SPRU Information, Networks & Knowledge 
(INK) research centre. 
1
  This has been so since the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) in 1887. The ICC was created to stem turmoil in the railway industry. It was 
abolished in 1995 with the creation of the Surface Transportation Board. The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) was established by the Communications Act of 
1934 and is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by 
radio, television, wire, satellite and cable. 
2
  British Telecom became a public limited company on 1 August 1984 and 51 per cent 
of the company’s shares were sold to the public in November of the same year. The 
company faced competition from Mercury when it launched services initially in the 
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City of London in 1993 and from cellular radio network service licensees granted to 
Cellnet and Vodafone. A Director General of Telecommunications was appointed and 
the Office of Telecommunications was established in 1984. 
3
  Oxman cites evidence of the low barriers to entry for Internet service suppliers in 
support of his argument in favor of “unregulation”; “Over 6,000 Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) today offer dial-up service to the Internet, and over 95% of 
Americans have access to at least four local ISPs [footnote omitted]. Although 
America OnLine, with over 18 million world-wide members, dominates the ISP field, 
millions of Americans rely on small one POP [Point of Presence] [footnote omitted] 
or medium-sized ISPs for their service, ISPs that may serve several hundred or fewer 
customers” (Oxman, 1999: 17). 
4  This view is closely aligned with the depiction of competition by Clark (1961) and is 
deeply embedded in Melody’s (1986) analysis of developments in telecommunication 
markets. More generally, we take a classical approach, which analyses competition 
“not as a state of affairs, but as a dynamic process linking technical change with 
market behaviour” (Corsi, 1991: 113) and which links processes of division of labor 
through technical change with the evolution of market structure. 
5  The technical definition of the Internet was agreed by the Federal Networking 
Council (FNC) in October 1995 (Leiner et al., 1998) and see also (Zakon, 1999). The 
National Science Foundation lifted restrictions on the commercial use of the Internet 
in the United States in 1991 and by 1995 the Internet backbone network was entirely 
operated by private network operators. In the United Kingdom, the start of the 
JANET service using the TCP/IP began in 1991.  
6
  See (Department of Commerce, 1999; Department of Trade and Industry, 1998; 
European Commission High Level Group of Experts, 1997). 
7
  This section draws extensively on evidence from company annual reports and 
accounts, information obtained from company web sites and press releases, 
newspaper articles, etc., the details of which are available from the authors of this 
chapter. Substantial information was obtained from US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Filings, particularly schedules 13D and 13G. The “Guide to 
Corporate Filings” can be accessed at http://www.sec.gov. Detailed references to all 
documentation can be obtained by contacting the authors of this chapter.  
8
  A first wave of inward foreign investment occurred in the early phase of liberalization 
in the cable and telecommunication industry in the mid-1980s. There was a 
substantial inflow of investment into the cable television industry by American-
owned firms. This was followed by a period of disappointing cable (and later 
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telephony) market development and consolidation of ownership. A recent flurry of 
investment as cable companies position themselves in the Internet access market 
(Collins and Murroni, 1996).  
9
  Energis also acquired Unisource Carrier Services (UCS) from Unisource NV a well-
established Telecom network Provider, with Internet Access and Services.  
10
  Dixons Group plc’s major shareholders are Merrill Lynch & Co Inc. with 11.95 per 
cent of common stock, Mercury Asset Management Ltd with 10.94 per cent, Capital 
Group Companies Inc. with 7.03 per cent, and the Prudential Corporation Group of 
companies with 4.02 per cent. 
11
  The British Labour Party distributed Freeserve’s software as part of an advertising 
campaign with Labour Inside, Vol. 1 in October 1999.  
12
  In October 1999, CurrantBun was expected to be re-launched with a new name at a 
marketing cost of £4 million.  
13
  LineOne was a subscription fee ISP. The company moved into the subscription-free 
segment of the ISP market as a result of the growing strength of competitors in the 
consumer segment of the market. 
14
  The National Grid plc. was formed in March 1990 as part of the privatization of the 
electricity supply industry in England and Wales. It was owned jointly by 12 regional 
electricity companies until it was floated on 11 December 1995 on the London Stock 
Exchange. Energis was formed in 1993 as a telecommunication spin-off of the 
National Grid’s electricity transmission activities. 
15
  The National Grid formed a consortium with SPRINT and France Telecom and won 
the license to operate new national and international telecommunication services in 
Brazil.  
16
  The Massachusetts Department of Telecommunication and Energy must approve the 
merger. The National Grid plc. made financial provisions for the acquisition of EUA 
in its agreement for the acquisition of NEES.  
17
  Colt Telecom launched an ISP in the United Kingdom, Colt Internet, in 1993. Colt 
Telecom has also selected NTL to terminate its switched traffic outside London and 
provide leased digital private circuits between London and major cities in the United 
Kingdom.  
18
  NTL Inc. owns just under 50% of Virgin Net’s common stock. 
19
  It is important to note that Telewest is a subsidiary of Microsoft and Libert Media, 
and Libert Media is a subsidiary of AT&T. Microsoft and Libert Media hold 
respectively 29.9% and 21.6% of Telewest’s stock. NTL, Cable & Wireless, and 
Telewest have been in competition in the market in the United Kingdom. 
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20
  As a result of the transaction, “Existing CWC Shareholders will receive 3.6301 shares 
of new NTL Common Stock and 190.18 pounds in cash for every 100 CWC Shares 
held (and so on in proportion to their holdings, assuming no adjustment is made). 
CWC Shareholders’ entitlements to fractions of new NTL Common Stock will be 
aggregated and sold in the market and the net proceeds paid to the relevant CWC 
Shareholders” (Cable & Wireless Plc., 1999). 
21
  At an exchange rate of 46.250 for 100 (former) CWC shares. 
22
  “Effective at 11.58pm on 29 January 1998, WorldCom Inc. ***(“WorldCom”) 
acquired the company pursuant to the merger (The “merger”) of BV Acquisition Inc., 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of WorldCom, with and into Brooks. Upon consummation 
of the merger, the company became a wholly-owned subsidiary of WorldCom” 
(Brooks Fiber Properties Inc., 1998: 3). 
23
  These acquisitions included MovieFone Inc., a major movie guide and ticketing 
interactive service; Spinner Networks Inc. which provides music over the Internet; 
When Inc., offering a personalized event directory and calendar services; At Wet Inc. 
and Personal Logic Inc.  
24
  The benefits of the division of labor and specialization have long been the subject of 
the analysis of changing industrial structure. Adam Smith argued that the division of 
labor, technical change and specialization is essential to saving production and 
circulation time and to the ability to increase capacity throughput*** (Smith, 1776: 
7).  
25
  Calls were made by the first author to premium rate technical support lines. X-Stream 
responded in just under ten minutes and the call was charged at a rate of 50 pence per 
minute. These costs in time and money must be added to those paid by the customer 
for use of online services. 
 
26  “Money, in its significant attribute is, above all, a subtle device for linking the present 
to the future” (Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, pp. 
293-4). 
